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Book Reviews
Subjective Criticism by David Bleich.

Baltimore and London:

The Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1978. Pp. 309. $16.00.
Subjective Criticism, the approach to the literary experience that gives priority
to the reader as the maker of literary meanings and values, has been steadily
gaining currency in recent years, as traditional interpretive practices have
appeared to lose their authority, and their practitioners some of their confidence.
This mid-life crisis of the humanities, a crisis of flagging energies and declining
enrollments, may be no better reflected than in the widespread stratagems of
beleaguered academics to pep up their work by adopting revolutionary programs
of research and analysis and declaring prior modes of study obsolete, even when,
as is sometimes the case, the turnover in interpretations is so rapid that what is
being discarded has scarcely even been heard of. Subjective Criticism is just one of
many such stratagems and by no means the latest, and as promoted by David Bleich
it has all the earmarl{s of the average interpretive revolution, freely announcing
the bankruptcy of all received literary knowledge and even challenging the
notion that worthwhile knowledge can be received at all. In Bleich's rendering,
Subjective Criticism asks the critic to make a new start, to cast off the threadbare
lendings -of graduate school (usually a coat and tie), break the hammerlock
of the exhaustive bibliography, and vanquish the authority of the past. It urges
him to be born again.
That is no mean appeal nowadays; there is fun and occasional profit in
rebirth, even where the accrued benefits add up to little more than a fresh
approach to literature and a new audience for one's work-in this case departments of Education in search of new ways to dispel the doldrums of the
classroom. For what Subjective Criticism offers as a day to day bonus to the
teacher is a regime of classroom exercises designed to enliven discussion by
unlocking the personal meaning of the literary experience, encouraging students
and professors alike to pool their responses to the text and, as Bleich puts it,
to negotiate a communal interpretation. All reports back from the Subjective
classroom, at least from the teachers, would appear to be positive. It sounds like
a lively place.
But David Bleich's book, Subjective Criticism, is anything but a book about
the formation of interpretive communities t;hrough the pooling and negotiation
of responses, for Bleich is stalking bigger game than the over-controlled classroom
or the over-prepared lecture. In a series of breathtaking assertions about origins
and transmission of learning, Bleich issues a challenge to nothing less than the
whole tradition of rational empiricism upon which Western science is founded,
and which even constitutes, as Bleich believes, the prevailing rules of cultural
knowledge. The villain in Bleich's view of modern education-and he makes no
bones about its villainy-is "-objective" lmowledge and its repressive con-
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ncction to established religious authority. Bleich is quite serious about this.
Citing Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as his authority,
Bleich holds current notions of "objectivity" that sustain modern scientific
inquiry to be nothing more than disposable paradigms of experience that just
happen to be around because they suit our current emotional needs and present
levels of cultural development, or used to, at any rate, since objectivity is
fast being discredited. In a word, Western culture has clung so tenaciously to
the "objective" mode of inquiry because it has proven to be, until now,
"adaptive." This objectivity has also been, in Bleich's view, hierarchical and
cocrci\'c bccausc institutionally bound up with religion. The origins of objectivity lie in religion ;Jnd not, as somc of us had mistakenly thought, in a
renegade movcment of sccular empiricism that had gained currency during the
Renaissance. As evidence of this collusion Bleich cites the community censorship
hearing in which "objective" authorities in the field of literature play along
with local priests and bigots in the suppression of dangerous books and
threatening ideas.
Bleich bears down hard on this point, that "objectivity" (he never refers
to rationalism or empiricism) is the instrument of religious authority, and he
is guite prepared to call both science and religion to account as mutually Ieinforcing superstitions. Objectivity and moral authority, he insists, are in cahoots,
though what modem science ever did for religion besides cooperate in the
suppression of pornography he is not prepared to say. But, as he puts it, H The
'laws' of na,turc and God have the same origin and purpose as laws issued by
kings or enacted by legislatures-to provide a stable framework for social
functioning." Sllbjectf.-.)c Criticism, going far afield, unmasks the laws of nature
as ideology, as organized cpistemological fraud in the service of social harmony
and spccial interests: the new clergy of scicnce. Once this accusation is out, we
can sec ,,,here wc'rc headed, for Bleich's revolutionism is nothing if not thoroughgoing: Subjecth'e Criticism is a manifesto for the liberation of man from hard
data.
This assault upon traditional scicnce is crucial to Bleich because he holds
science, or at least the public image of science as a body of universal laws
based on irrcfuublc facts, responsible for the distortions of literary intelligence
th~t crept into the classroom \\'ith 1. A. Richards and the New Criticism,
which he charges with bcing a surrcndcr to "objectivism," turning the literary
text into a definablc object, whose internal !a,vs and external circumstances can
be pinned dO\\"n and exhaustcd by modern tcclmiqnes of analysis. Bleich's
method of debunking" objectivity" is to turn the tables on such science by
im"oking the perspecti\'ism of modern sciencc, espccially Hcisenberg's Uncertaint:' Principle, \\'hich holds th:~t thc obscn'cr interferes with what is observcd,
inrroducing an clemcnt of unccrtainty into his calculations, and Einstcin's Rchri\·it~·, \\'hich dClllonstL1teS that the positions, nlocitics, and masscs of objects
in rcbti\'c Tllotion, and cven the flow of timc, arc illusions of viewpoint. TIlis
new scicncc, Bkich tclls tIS, conforms to the "subjectivc paradigm" by which
we h:n'c now lc:mled to experience lifc, and if subjecti\'ity can so infiltratc thc
hardest corc of the lurd sciences, physics, what then can we say of thc study
uf literature \\'hich 11:1S ;dways bccn "suspect of harboring subje~ti\'e clcments'?
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Thus, "To make a distinction between the interpretive and quantitative sciences
for the purpose of assigning more or less authority to one of them is
no longer possible, and the subjective paradigm suggests that Imowledge in
general comes from synthesized interpretations."
Under Bleich's version of the subject paradigm, small group processes and
small group rationality are now the sine qua non of knowledge, and "if the
community finds the explanation satisfactory for its own purposes, this alone is
enough to render it adequate." Even mathematics, which we had supposed
immune to cultural bias and social pressure, comes into focus as a group symbolization, subject to the needs and motives of the group: "When scientific
explanation follows from the acceptance of a paradigm, this paradigm is constituted by a communal motive; mathematical fonnalism is an instrument of this
motive. Mathematical systems resymbolize those experiences which the original
belief in the paradigm has deemed 'presently adaptive to understand.'"
TillS idea that prevailing knowledge or paradigms of experience are merely
adaptive conveniences has a vaguely Marxist ring to it, but one looks in vain
for the systematic critique of "objectivity" and its relation to special interests
that one usually finds in the Marxist analysis. F 01' Bleich is no Marxist; he is
far too suspicious of the very notion of reality to entertain a line of inquiry
that stresses material conditions and forces. His subjective par:adigm shares with
Marxism only its rage against things as they are and the repressive authority
that has a stake in them. That is, substituting "objectivity" for capitalism,
Subjective Criticism shares with Marxism its rebellious myths but not its
analytic methods, including its scrupulous attention to the U fact."
Indeed, Bleich's sweeping indictments of rational empiricism lead him into
ridiculous positions, and his attempts to recruit post-relativistic science to the
cause of the subjective paradigm are an insult to the intelligence. What
could be more at variance with Bleich's U communal sufficiency" of knowledge
or the idea that theories of reality are "motivated resymboIizations" tllSfl
Relativity or Uncertainty which are, after all, rule-bound phenomena, predicted
by theoretical considerations and confirmed by observations. Relativity theory,
as Bleich lmows well, offers precise rules by which the dilations of time and the
increments of mass that affect a body moving rut nearly the speed of light may be
calculated, and' the perspectivism that such calculations introduce into science
is of a. far different order than the "subjective paradigm" Bleich wants to
promote as a nonn of reading. Nor was tJhere anything particularly subjective
about the way the Newtonian universe was replaced by the Relativistic. Both
Relativities, Special and General, gained acceptance by their capacity to explain
known observations and predict new ones, and their ability to withstand the
challenges of reason and evidence. They are not negotiated intersubjectivities let
alone projected, symbolized motives. And while Bleich claims, through most of
the book, to be following Thomas Kuhn in his insistence that knowledge is
governed by paradigms, he also acknowledges his departu:re from Kuhn over
me issue of empiricism, which Kuhn: is not prepared to discard.
One would never guess from reading Bleich that scientists constitute international communities, and that ·the rules of evidence and canons of reason tha.t
obtain among physicists in Huntsville or Kharkov or Lop Nor are remarkably
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consistent, and that scientists in sllch places are apt to share similar views on the
rest mass of the Lambda Plus particle or the rate of expansion of the Adantic
sea floor that owe nothing to Bleich's cherished schemes of subjectivity. Bleich
is ignorant of how scientific hypotheses are made and verified because he does
not CaTe about such matters; he cares only about the .rhetoric of revolutiOnary
purpose that can be appropriated from theorists such as Kuhn and Roger Poole,
and cavalierly dismisses any counter-proposals that science really might test
. reality as evidence of its deep connection with religion, a revelation of its
patrimony of authority and supcntition.
Of course, Bleich's style of playing f.ast and loose with science does not
of itself invalidate his propositions about the subjectivity of the reading experiences, but it docs reveal the book as a whole to be fundamentally a piece
of mythmaking in which the subjective elements in reading, rather than being
topics to be ex'amined in all curiosity, are treated as principles of heroic resistance to be defended. Learning ho\v the mind works is less to the point than
freeing oneself from the dead hand of the past. Thus the distortions of science
that follow from the book's ideology are, if anything, redoubled in Bleich's
depiction of the New Criticism, \vhose "objectivity," with its myths of the
objective text and its need for a hierarchy-really a hierophancy-of interpreters,
priests of the imagination, has inhibited the free play of critical inquiry. Granting
the element of truth in this-the well-lmmvn stringencies in the New Criticism
that arc everywhere ,3cknmvIedged-one vmuld still never guess from Bleich's
'tone thart the New Criticism could have produced a William Empson or a
Se-ven Types of Ambiguity, a book all about the hazards of categorical interpretation, or that concepts such as ambiguity, tension, paxadox, and conflict lay
at the very heart of ceTtain New Critical vocabularies. For indeed, when
you've enclosed yourself in a revolutionary myth that has to be defended at all
costs, contradictory evidence threatens to blow the whole system sky-l-ugh, and
how better to defend one's personal investment in illusion than to announce the
advent of mythic thinking itself-that henceforth subjectivity shall reign, starting
with one's own?
That is especially unfortunate because we have JUSt begun to think about the
dynamics of the classroom and how interpretation actually takes place. Subjective Criticism, informed as it is by psychoanalysis, would seem to offer one
promising approach to some questions about nhe personal dimensions of interpretation. But first it has to be purged of its own heroic and self-aggrandizing
mythologies, especially the parricidal myth of the repressiveness of all prior
knowledge, which effectively cuts it off from the rich reserves of both science
and! literary criticism that it needs to carry out its task with any sophistication.
MARK SHECIiNER

State University of New Yark-Buffalo
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Psychoanalysis, Creativity, and Literatzwe: A French-American Inquiry, edited
by Alan Roland. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Pp. viii + 368.
$20.00.

Like the course of true love, the history of psychoanalysis never has run smooth.
Neither, as a consequence, has the history of the relation between psychoanalysis
and literary studies. The history of psychoanalysis could be narrated in its own
language of development and defense: progressions involve regressions, positions
so controversial at one time they lead to schisms re-surface later to claim
ideological dominance by a kind of unacknowledged displacement of earlier
stands. Controversies in theory become linked to idealized individual, group
and national identities, so that they seem at once provincial and radically
consequential. Yet, as in individual developments, a new sophistication may
rather suddenly integrate what seemed permanently dis-unified, at least from
one perspective. Any history of psychoanalysis must take into account the
self-reflexive overdetennination of this artful science, the ways in which it is,
like Shakespeare in Sonnet 111, "subdn'd/To what it works in, like the Dyers
hand."
The identity of psychoanalysis is a psychoanalytic question which could be
asked through Psycboanalysis, Creathity and Lite1'ature. TIns book collects
seventeen essays that span a spectrum of styles of theoretical and applied
psychoanalysis so broad that I can imagine a "decomposition" course based
on it. Although billed as a "Franco-American Dialogue," the volume contains
precious little actual dialogue among its various loosely gathered parts. It is
more like the" corps morce16" imagined by Jacques Lacan to -portray the child
not yet in possescion of an image of its unity. Some essays seem to be transcripts
of talks delivered at the 1976 symposia of which this book is the monumenrt.
Others seem (and some are) revised versions of work published elsewhere. Still
others are fully polished work, clearly considered by the authors to be important
" position" papers. But, to change the metaphor, the volume as a whole seems
a Tower of Babel, not only because it gathers conceptual languages and ideological
commitments from North America and the Continent, but because its many
voices speak with too uneven degrees of ar.ticulated mastery of their chosen
material, and the editorial work has been minimal. In the Biblical story God
scattered the builders of Babel because they aspired to heaven. Here the
process seems simply reversed: an international colloquy in which the speakers
of different languages are merely collected, without enough of the deeper
translation that could show their complex inter-relations.
But in faimess to Roland and his contributors, I should say that they move
us closer to the possibility of this" deeper translation." The collection is also
called an "inquiry," and even in the absence of adequate introductory integration of its contents, the contents themselves can be seen as a representative
field of concepts and questions. To this extent, the volume offers something
of an antidote to the pessimistic summary of our contemporary situation spoken
by J. B. Pontalis: "... closed lingos that no longer refer to anything but themselves: there is an exchange, but only widl another whioh is the same as oneself-prevalence of endogamy." At least in the past, « inquiries" did lead to
more ffitimate, exogamous arrangements.
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The yolume as a whole represents the fields of theoretical and applied psychoanalysis in a process of metamorphic change which belies schematic description. Certainly no simple idea of "scientific progress" can be claimed to
comprehend the entire process, although the rhetoric of scientific discovery and
development docs characterize some essays. The" American" authors, unsurprisingly, stay closer to applied science objectifications of their interpretive
activit), than the" French." Thus Nonnan Holland represents identity theorythe general idea that we rc-crC2.tc some central theme of our being in all our
interactions, literary or not-as a "third phase" of psycho::tnalysis, superceding
the dualities of conscious vs. unconscious and ego vs. non-ego, the very dualities
that govern other essays in the volume. Ernest S. \Volt uses Sartre's and
Kafka's fictions to illustrate the new theory of narcissism developed by Heinz
Kohut. Albert Rothenberg claims to have discovered the structure of creative
thinking by empirical means. Hereafter, Janusian and Homospatial thinking,
concepts arrived at through "research observations" and "controlled experiments" can replace such noble precursors as Yin and Yang, Dionysian and
Apollonian. These" Americans" (and others could be added) are eager for
priority, for the mastery that derives from new theoretical techology, even when
they arc aware, as Holland surely is, that their theoretical positions extrapolate
their own identities, or, as 'Nolf is, that their" newness" re-states a relation
between empathy and" objectivity" as old as psychoanalysis.
There is, however, no uniformity among the" Americans." We even have a
marginally psychoanalytic piece by Kenneth Bur1{e, who is sui generis. The
Rankian and Eriksonian contributions have a closer affinity with religious wishes
for wholeness and dC\'otion than '''1th the styles of their more positivist
companions. Thus j\,jargaret Brenman-Gibson can interpret Clifford Odets'
painful fantasy of bein:; eaten by his audience as "integrating the contraries,
including feminine and masculine identity elements." Such Eriksonian idealization allics her contribution with that of Roland and Rizzo, who adopt the
language of "meaningful relations nand "self-realization" in their search for
Pirandello. Vi/hat these" Americans" lack, it seems to me, is the self-conscious
irony that enlinns some of the "French," the irony that would lead them to
sec through the more \'acuous expressions of therapeutic wishfulnes5. Compare
Andre Green, for "rhom the work of art" opts for life's illusory clamor, as
against the certainty of death."
Indeed, onc of the distinguishing marks of the It French" challenge to the
morc sunny-minded nrsions of psychoanalysis generated by H American)) writers is just this return to and preoccupation \vith Freud's "death-drh'c." The
" French" inLltuation with ps)'cho:malysis during the past ten years~lucidly
fe-coumed in its sociological dimension by Sherry Turklc in this \'olume~lnvol\'es
a deep ~lli:l.llce- with the frcud of Beyond tbe Pleasure Principle, a text \vhich is
made to support two central tenets: that Desire (commonly so personified) is
to be understood :lS an endless process of sllbsiriturive actions and H objectchoices," a process in which eyery significant choice is also an announcement of
lo~s (the presence of "dc:lth" in psychic mobility); and th~t, in the words of
Fr:m),ois Pcr:11di's contribution, "The ego is that part of the subject manufactured through a series of alienating identifications." \Vhateyer else one might
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say of the cult of Lacan in Paris, these two tenets have carried over into much
less obscurantist! styles than his, and, once we jettison his half-formed linguistics
based on Saussure, we have in them a challenge to "American" ideologies that
derive from Heinz Hartmann's ego psychology. What is <I alienating" about
identifications in the" French" view, is the way in which they lead us to confuse
historical realities with reality itself. And what is implied in the concept of
mobile desire is that all attempts at closure .of meaning mask motives to dominate
their object. Understood in this way! the" French" stance turns out to have
some unsuspected affinities with the kinds of open readings derived from everchanging relationships which Norman Holland represents in theory and practice.
Self and other each become relational, historical transforms of one another.
(The difference, however, is crucial. For Holland ,t.'1ere is no subject beyond
the identity principle. For the "French" view derived from Lacan, the subject
must eyjst, somehow beyond his reflection in image and word, or he would
not be there to become" alienated.")
But it would be much of a mistake to equate the "French" contributions
to this book with Laoan as it would .to equate' the "American" with one of
I its patriarchs. There arc, if anything, even more splits in Paris than in other
schools of theory. One can hea'r criticism of prevruling dogma in most of
the "French" essays. Julien Bigras voices what seems to me the most telling
limitation of his Parisian training:
Coupled with the awesome emphasis placed on theory, intellectualism
was particularly manifest whenever the student-analyst had to discuss
a patient's case. In fact he was often incapable of doing so: the patient
was often little more than a pretext for performing what might be
called theoretical gymnastics.
'\iVhat is implied here is that the theoretical apparatus, whatever its internal merits
and confusions, comes to defend against feelings and to prevent the experience
of relationships between people. "'hat could be less psychoanalytic! If the
" American" fault is an overcommitment to experiences of synthesis and integration, the" French" counterpart seems to be a hypercathexis of theory itself.
But the opposition of «French" and «American" has its limits, which is
why I have kept them in quotes. This book is both a symptom of and a
contribution to the inter-penetration of styles that is coming to characterize psychoanalytic writing. On the theoretical level, we are beginning to see effects
of the French in American writing (even in the «official" journals), and we
are hearing of .Margaret Mahler, Rene Spitz, even Otto Kernberg in French
training. On the level of writing, we are beginning to see that the articulation
of theory is itself a "literary" activity, involving a "languaging" of experience
as complex in its potential effects and ambiguities as the language it has traditionally taken as its object of analysis. The French have been especially
challenging in this respect, which may be one reason why, for all his obscurity
and tricksterism, Lacan continues to appeal to literary critics.
Three essays in Psychoanalysis, Creativity and Literature seem best representatives of this inter-penetration of languages. Norman Holland's "Literary
Interpretation .and Three Phases of Psychoanalysis" brings the question of
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psychoanralytic language into historical focus and opens the possibilities of psychoanalytic interpretation to individual style. Andre Green's "The Double and
the Absent" shows the kind of mastery that transcends notions of "appJied"
psychoanalysis. At once psychoanalytic and literary, his essay brings an eloquence
of writing to a deep understanding of the place of writing and reading in the larger
cultural sp,lee of shared experience. Rene Girard also exemplifies the mutuality that
can derive from giving psychoanalysis and literature equal rights. In" Narcissism:
The Freudian Myth Demythificd by Proust," he reads Proust's representation
of ,the mil~age of narcissistic self-sufficiency to show that Proust understood
what Freud acts out in his theory of narcissism. Gir:ard also offers a jargonless
expression of the possible future for literature and psychoanalysis:
Between the intuitions and limitations of psychoanalytical theory on
the one hand, and of great literature on the other, there is a gap that we
must bridge. Literature and psychoanalysis in the best sense need eacb
otber. 1\1y intention is not to build up Proust against Frcud, or evcn
less "literature" against "psychoanalysis," but to facilitate a dialogue
benvcen the two, a dialogue of equals that has never occurred so far,
and through the fault of literary critics, really, as much as of psychoanalysts.
There arc signs, then, that the Tower of Babel houses common places as well
as closed lingos. The work of deeper translation has begun.
MURRAY
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Cbmzge and Decline: R(;Tl1Cm LiteTat71Te in tbe Early Empire by Gordon Williams.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978. Pp. vi + 344.
~12.50.

The issue Williams tackles here ought to be of fund.amental interest not just
for classioal studies but for literary criticism in general: just how (if at all)
can we evaluate and understand decline in a culture's literary tradition? Specifically, his focus is "Silver Age" Latin literature (spanning roughly the first two
centuries A.D.). Because many of the writers of this -age influenced European
authors from the Renaissance on, this book should gain ,vide interest with nOllclassicists. Unfortunately, its shortcomings seriously mar irs contribution.
The major fault, vvhich subsumes the ,varIes other deficiencies, is one that
bedevils most classical philology and threatens to make it a solipistic science, the
failure to come to grips with, much less utilize, modern critical methodoJogies.
Like"\vise, Williams fails to articulate or justify what methodology he himself will
use, although it soon becomes apparent. It is old style philology, where numerous texts are culled, collected, arranged, and juxtaposed, where verbal, stylistic,
thematic similarities (and dissimilarities), all based, it :turns out, on the categories
of classical rhetoric, are noticed, toted up, and appreciated. But such cumu-
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lations are not illuminating. The reason is clear: texts do not t..uk to texts.
Works of literature manifest complex interaotions between ,author and text,
between author and his real or imagined audience, between author and his culture;
they striye to mediate personal, social, and thus inevitably cultural contradiotions. 'While it is apparent Williams feels these issues, he skirts them, and
his analysis focuses on artificial formalistic aspects of the putative decline,
without coming to grips with the untidy. but very revealing, disruptions between
literary paradigms and the discrepant realities they no longer effectively control.
Indeed, the inadequacy of Williams's outmoded technique is its very refutation,
the poverty of insights it brings to its subject matter and the questions it leaves
unanswered. Thus, Williams's conclusions are uninformative, thQugh predictable, shibboleths: Roman literature declined because of pessirnisIDj in a decadent
culmre, escapism, retreat from reality, the increasing dominance of Greek culture,
archaism, failure of intellectual nerve, and the changed conception of the
function of literature (e. g., i11litatio and aemulatio). Even if these were valid
or useful oassessments, they would not be explanations of literary decline, but
manifestations. What we would really waIllt to know is what lay behind these
.alleged phenomena. But locked into outworn and sterile critical modes aoo
valuations, Williams lacks a pOll Ito, an external intellectual fulcrum from whioh
to lever his material.
Regrettable too is Williams's unwillingness seriously to examine, except in a
dismissive preterition, the issue central to the book's thesis: whether Roman
literature really was in decline at all in the first two cennrr.i.es A. D., indeed,
whether we can legitimately speak of literill]' decline in any significant or
fruitful way. Williams does acknowledge with some discomfort that this might
be an issue, noting some critics have recently become increasingly favorahle in
their judgment of Silver Age Latin literature. But seeing a sinister coincidence
of our contemporary tastes and standards with those .of the decadent age under
scrutiny, he decries this critical stance as "subjective" and worries, "Has
literary history any value under such conditions? Is it even possible?" (p. 1).
Obviously not for Williams, who biases his .discussion with the old Roman
notion, so prevalent in the Silver Age itself, that literary and political decline
are results of moral decline.
Finally, it is significant that this work really dwells most on poetry (Willlirams's
metier), while prose is treated (except for Tacitus' gelid DiaZo gus) ,in desultory
fashion, a serious debility, given the work's .ambitious aim. Strikingly, while
Lucan, Statius, and Ovid are given great attention, Petronius languishes, quoted
only once, and then JUSt to instance Eumolpus' declamatio on the decadence of
the age (pp. 11-12). What is there about the Satyri.~on-rich, varied, restlessthat merits this silence? One answer may be that Petronius' text probes too deeplyand disturbingly-into the profound culnrral inconsistencies of Roman imperial
life and literature. To confront this text would mean jarring the tidy, formalistic explanation of Roman literary decline Williams sets forth. In sum,
while Williams's book is a sincere and erudite effort, its lack of a feasible
critical method both stymies its author's investigations, making him avoid the
crucial issues or offer superficial explanations, and thus frustrates his readers.
K. R.

Wa,lle State Unlverrity

WALTERS
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Tbe Song of Roland: An Al1"lytical Edition (2 vols.) by Gerar,d J. Brault.
University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978.
Pp. xviii + 574; vi + 282. $20.00; $12.00.
Gemrd J. Brault's ,two volume analytical edition of Tbe Song of Roland
is an ambitious project handsomely executed. Volume I consists of a substantial
introduction covering matters historical, exegetical, textual, and literary. followed
by a laisse-by-b.issc commentary on the poem. Both the Introduction and
Commentary are copiously annotated; the volume concludes with a bibliography,
a well-conceived index and an attractive series of illustrative plates. Volume II
is Brault's edition of the Oxford Song of Roland, accompanied by a facing
English translation. As the editor adopts a fairly conservative approach to the
text, introducing emendations only where they are generally sanctioned by
previous editors or necessitated by obvious scribal error, the notes to tihe manuscript are fairly brief. The notes to the text and translation are more extensive.
Volume II-the edition proper-is a treat. Although Brault notes that "This
book is chiefly intended for medievalists," his text is as well-suited to the
student as to the scholar. It is a remarkably clean text, as Brault has wisely
C1hosen not to clutter the page with footnote numbers or typographical indications of emendations. The translation is also an asset; facing lines correspond
cxacdy, and Brault has deliberately eschewed" any attempt to capture the flavor
of the original" in order to "render each word and phrase accurately." VVhere
this editor's laisse and line numbering differ from those in previous editions,
conventional numbering is enclosed in brackets.
It is obvious from the extent of his annotation that Brault's project has
been exhaustively researched: nearly one third of the first volume is devoted to
notes (there are 615 footnotes on the Ill-page introduction alone), and in
both volumes the annotation, rich and scrupulously cross-referenced, encompasses a vast range of material. Ironically, however, the virtues of the annotationits comprehensiveness and scrnpulosity-become major weaknesses .in the expository sections, the Introduction and Commentary. Quite simply, Brault has tried
to do too much. In the Foreword he announces that he has intentionally
adopted an eclectic method of analysis, a method which the book-jacket praises
(not inaccurately) as "often little short of encyclopedic." Unfortunately, the
eclectic and the encyclopedic conspire against Brault's objective of providing" a
systematic literary analysis of the entire poem," for eclecticism emerges here
rather as a lack of method, in which the mixed methodologies remain uncomfortably dissociated, while the encyclopedic impulse, the evident desire to leave
no stone unturned, ultimately defies system, and thus cannot provide a coherent
approach to the poem.
Commentary 19, on laisses 133-135, will seNe as illustration. These three
laisses descrLbe Roland's sounding the oliphant, and the varying responses of the
distant listeners in Charlemagne's entourage, climaxing in their recognition of
Roland's distress. Brault's admittedly learned commentary takes us far afield.
In the first six relatively brief paragraphs, he covers modern responses to the
passage, the horn as a medieval hunting instrument, images of horn-blowers
and archers in Romanesque bas-relief and sculpture, theological implications of
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the hunting metaphor, associations of a horn with the supernatural in medieval
secular literature, the recent an-ivai in France of carved elephant-tusk horns,
and possible evocation, through the horn's call, of Psalm 130, and hence of the
Last Judgment. Following these observations, during the course of which the
commentator has alluded to Alfred de Vigny, the Andlau sculptor, Chretien de
Troyes, Robert Biker, Huon de Bordeaux and the Pseudo-Tm'pin Chronicle, is a
three-page excursus on a crux in the Oxford manuscript (Ganelon's odd reference
to Roland's flooding the field in the" conquest of Naples "), the discussion
proceeding from the manuscript traditions through the washing-ai-blood as a
folIc-motif in the Tristan, Chretien and Shakespeare, to the motifs allegorical
significance in Prudentius. Finally, Roland's having remained unwounded to
this moment suggests to the commentator another association with the supernatural, and his speculation that a wound such as Roland's would probably
result in prolonged agony leads to the conclusion that Roland's suffering
"accentuates the parallel with the Passion of Our Lord." If there is a theme,
a stance, a reading here, it remains obscure.
And it seems that the farther Brault is from the immediate text, the less
controlled his Row of information becomes, for the somewhat patchwork nature
of the Commentary, the air of free-association, is magnified in the Introduction
which, divided into twenty-one separate sections, is structurally paratactic and
baldly lU1dersynthesized. Classification at all levels seems arbitrary at best.
Why, for example, should the section entitled "Landscape" (# 16, essentially
symbolic topography) have equal status ,vith such broad topics as "The Church
and the Arts," or "The Meaning of the Song of Rolcmd ))? Why, for that matter,
isn't natural symbolic topography classified with man-made symbolic topography
such as "The Road," or "The Two Cities," which appear under the rather
puzzling heading of "Metaphorical Consistency" (# 15)? Why, in fact, aren't
all types of symbolism included under one head? "Number Symbolism" turns
up in "Narrative Devices and Teclmiques" (# 18), as does a sub-section on
" Geometricism," which is surely an aspect of " Structure" (# 13). The encyclopedic impulse intrudes here too; I can find no rationale, other than a desire
for ultimate comprehensiveness, for the inclusion of ~uch sections as the
grandiosely-and misleadingly-titled "Ambiguity and Logic" (# 9), which consists of two, brief, truistic paragraphs stating that, like all poetry, Roland
employs the "metaphorical mode," and that thus "one must at times put aside
twentieth-century notions of what constitutes logic or common sense." Audience,
as well as order, is lost in the shuffle.
What we really have in the Introduction and Commentary is annotation
masquerading as exposition, notes without numbers. But the Raws of Volume
I are perhaps the inevitable result of what is, after all, a praiseworthy ambition,
an ambition satisfyingly realized in other aspects of the work, and they should
not, in the end, obscure the genuine', value of Brault's undertaking. One carmot
be all things to all readers, and if Brault's strengths do not lie in exposition or
synthesis, his exemplary text and the rich range of information he makes
accessible in both volumes should earn the gratimde of students and scholars for
years to come.
ELIZABETH S. SKLAR
Wayne State University
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Rbetorical Norms in Renaissance Literature by William J. Kennedy. New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1978. Pp. vii + 229. $13.50.
Kennedy has two interests. One is in the rhetorical approach to discourse
as a corrective to and expansion of currently fashionable verbal analyses, the
other is in the literary history of the Renaissance. As a theoretician, he places
his rhetorical interest in a context of linguistics, strucruralism, and hermenleutics.
As a practical critic and historian, he discusses in some detail nine major pieces
of Renaissance literature, from Petrarch to Milton, with reference to a host of
their contemporary Latin and vernacular works. Throughout he invites a view
of the comparative advantages of rhetorical attitudes and offers a conclusion that,
tonally at least, makes explicit his intention to have written something of a
polemic.
The effectiveness of the polemic, if it is that, \vill have to be detennined by
someone who is not already, like the present reviewer, a partisan of the
rhetorical approaches. Most rhetoricians will find Kennedy articulating forcibly
a position which we already hold. I do not mean to imply that rhetoricians
will not profit from reading this book; on the contrary, we-and, for that
mattcr, all students of the Renaissance-\vill find this work illuminating and richly
suggestive. But we are not among the theoreticians in Kennedy's audience.
They are, rather, the students of de Saussurc, Barthes, Jakobson, not to mention
Hirsch, Gadamer, Derrida, Greimas, Todorov. In fact, S'0 skiHfully docs the
introductory chapter set up Kennedy's study that a rhetorician is likely to pass
from it to the remainder of the book fearing that he will find therein only
formalism (or structuralism or any other objectivism) in a new guise.
But that is not the case. No approach deserves to be called rhetorical, Kennedy
well realizes, unless it keeps at the center of its concerns the complex interactions of a speaker and an audience. Thus, the real source of the "nonns "
Kennedy discusses arc" voice" and" address." These are at the center of his
explorations of "mode," "style," and "genre," a critical triad dear to the
hcarts of the theoreticians in his audience. Each part of this triad is given a
section of the book
"The Perrarchan Mode in Lyric Poetry" is the first major section of Kennedy's practical criticism. In i.t, etbos and pathos emerge as the two chief terms
of his critical operations, the fanner naming the audience's perception of the
speaker, the btter the speaker's efforts to control his 2udience's response. The
Petra,rchan mode, Kennedy argues, requires a perceptible, split between the poet
and ,his speaker, and a correlative split benveen a fictive and an actual audience.
Petrarch's Crrnzoniere, Ronsard's Les AmollTS, and Sidney's Ast70phil and Stella
nre the major worles discussed in this mode. So arranged, the works not only
present developments in rhetorical norms of Renaissance Petrarcbism but also
offer a kind of history designed to illustrate Kennedy'S claim" that strategies of
voice and address characterize the mode better than elocutionary figures and
other vcrb:d de\·ices do" (p. 71).
" Irony" is the major stylistic quality which Kelmedy examines in-again,
arranged in hisroricll order-Erasmus's The Praise of Folly, Thomas More's
Utopia, and Rabcbis's Grrrgamurr and Pantagrllel, with most attention paid
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to the last work. But it becomes appa:rent that " style~" like "mod,e," namesl, no
real part of Kennedy's concern. "Irony" is, obviously. ·a stylistic quality, and
most readers would agree that the word defines the styles of the three pieces
examined. But Kennedy's ex.amination continually veers away from elocutio
and toward speakers and audiences, in or:der that his discussion of these pieces
may show" the impossibility of understanding a text through its verbal strategies
alone and ... the need for .coming to terms with the characterization of the
speaker and his relationship \vith the audience" (p. 105).
Like "style," "genre" becomes a subject which allows Kennedy 00 group
certain major works in the Renaissance and, more importantly. to offer a critique
of certain fashionable approaches. However" genre ,; is singular among the
triad of critical terms Kcnnedy uses to structure his work, for it is one he
would most seek to preserve, reform, and continue to use. He would do that
by giving it a flexibility that it lacks in mndenl theory. He concentrates on the
epic genre, in particular Ariosto's Orlando< Furioso, D' Aubigne's Les Tragiques,
and Milton's Paradise Lost. His ultimate view of that genre is one encompassing "an inspired speaker who is at once an audience of the action that he
describes and a medi1tor bctw'een ,that action and his o-wn auclience" Cp. 187).
Thus, concepts of genre, he attempts to show, achieve flexibility by approaches
through ethos and patbos.
Obviously, in so short a book the author cannot offcr detailed analyses of
individual pieces. This is perhaps nowhere more noticeable than in his rapid
course through the epics. But if his sweep is bmad, his stated intention is to
be suggestive, to encourage further work Moreover, as noted, it is quite
apparent that his primary role is that of a critic of c.ritics, one dissatisfied- with
current approaches, a stance made explicit several times and reiterated in the
conclusion, part of which is "aimed against certain deconstructive tendencies to
flatten ,out literature and literary history to the play of defined verbal antinomies" (p. 191).
Kennedy's work should have appeal for these critics, these non-partisan
readers who are not yet convinced of the value of rhetorical attkudes toward
discourse. Attracted by an evidenc concern with "norms" and winh a familiar
critical triad, they will be dra\.V11 into a case that challenges their very assumptions
ahout how literary language works. It may he that some will find Kennedy'S
case a litle too easily confirmable, for who can doubt the rhetorical nature
of Renaissance literature? And" genre ,~ as defined seems unquestionably useful
in discussions of epic. Then, too, no one likes to have his territory threatened.
Even the partisans, the rhetoricians, may wish tbeir territoTY had been given a
little more recognition through at least a clearer use of the history of rhetorical
theory. Nonetheless, the breadth of Kennedy'S reading and the depth of his
Imowledge of litcralY history lend a cogency to his argument which should be
difficult for anyone to resist or gainsay.
THOMAS

Tbe University of California, Berkeley
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Whatever Happened to SlJakespeare? by Kenneth McClellan. New York: Barnes
and Noble, 1978. Pp. 230. $18.50.

Die.

Kenneth McClellan utilizes his experience as ,director and actor (in over a
hundred Shakespearean roles) in his lively description of the state of Shakespeare
on the historical and contemporary stage. While his account is neither as scholarly
nor as focused as, for example, Hazelton Spencer's Sbakespeare Improvpd, which
deals with Shakespearean adaptations on the Restoration stage, McClellan ambitiously wades through three centuries of productions, setting aside fewer than
fifteen pages £or translation and twelve for films. It is only "with some reluctance," he adds, that he has "set asi.de the many operas based on plays of
Shakespeare ...."
Nor does Mr. McClellan pretend' to the objectivity of a scholarly Spencer.
He dismisses without hesitation Dryden's All for Love (" a debasement of Shakespeare rather than an original work "), Oliver, Orson Welles,- Zeferelli, Guthrie,
Laughton, and especially Peter Brook. In a postscript characteristic of his
style, he remarks that "the world will little note nor long remember the
attempts of Messrs.~ Bond, Ionesco and Osborne to w.rite better plays than
Shakespeare on the subjects of Lear, Macbeth and Coriolanus."
Noting flaws in Mr. McClellan's own study would be too simple to do. One
upset, for example, with his summary dismissal of Ernest Jones' Freudian views
of Hamlet and Othello, need point only to McClellan's amateurish psychoanalysis
of the directorial and designing methods of Gordon Craig: "The son of Ellen
Terry by the designer E. W. Godwin, the real father-figure in his life was his
mother's stage partner and off-stage lover Henry Irving." Continuing his
" analysis" to explain once again what has happened to Shakespeare, McClellan
adds, "As time went on, Craig sought to dethrone the dramatist even more
fiercely than he had once sought to diminish the actor. Shakespeare replaced
Irving as his Laius-figure."
The book's chief flaw, it seems to me, is the unrelenting nature of McClellan's
message as to what has happened to Shakespeare. From the very title to the
final chapter, we are told that Shakespeare should always be pru"e-ungimmicky
and even uncut. He never pauses long enough to ask if a production containing
all the lines of the second quarto and First Folio of Hamlet, for example, was
ever played or meant to be.
Still the work is worth reading and fOT more than its witty phrasing..McClellan's
encyclopedic memory for the details of Shakespearean productions are as amusing
as they are worthy of record. His memory of productiDns spans many yearsfrom the all male and all female As You Like It; from the "inevitable"
Tmiius and Cressida ,,,ith men playing women and the women, men; to the
motif of -endless bicycles in modern dress Shakespearean productions! It is faT
the recounting of hundred's of these production-oriented details that we owe
most to lvIr. McClellan's work.
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Dickens and Reality by John Romano. New York: Columbia University Press,
1978. Pp. 187. $12.00.
George Eliot & Tbe Novel of Vocation by Alan Mintz. Cambridge, Mass. and
London: Harvard University Press, 1978. Pp. xi 193. 1,11.00.

+

Anthony Trollope by Arthur Pollard. London: Henley and Boston: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1978. Pp. 208. $12.75.
One might call this review "Pictures at an Exhibition," for terms from the
Ro·
mano's study of Dickens is a small yet masterly" canv.as," shot through, however,
with touches of sfumato. Mintz's work calls to mind an Escher graphic (or
Gestalt optical puzzle); in his study what we think of as background and
foreground collide and seem to reverse places. And Pollard's study could be
likened to nothing better than a William Frith painting, immediztely recognizable and pretending to be no more than it is, for his author-guide to Trol1ope
is filled with a veritable Derby-Day crow~d of Trollopian characters-and novels!
John Romano's Dickens and Reality is an intriguing, ambitious attempt to
define that uneasy relztion benveen the imaginary -and 'real worlds by focusing
on the nature of "realist" fonn, the implications of that form for Dickens'
themes and characterization, the role of free play in Dickens' language, the
function of sentimentality with respect to aesthetics in Oliver Twist (a "social
protest" novel), and the function of Dombey and Son as Dickens' "novel
of reality "-his standard form, according to Romano. In each chapter Romano
selects crucial passages from the novels 2l1d submits these to a finely-tuned,
search for paradigms of Dickens' form. Almost the first half of his study
focuses on Om' NIutual Friend, but attention is also devoted to Little Dorrit,
The Old Curiosity" Shop, and of course Oliver Twist and Dombey and Son.
Romano's argument that Dickens creates" open form" is in itself familiar. But
he, goes one step further: Dickens' form is open because it opens onto, signals,
and thus forever r~minds us of rhe larger world of which he and his readers
are a part.
Ro~ano takes on a galaxy of stellar critics (from Ian Watt to J. Hillis Miller)
'\vho would disqualify Dickens from realism because his fantastic characters like
Quilp or Jenny Wren contravene verisimilitude (i. e. l "normal," everyday details), or because th~ world of Dickens' novels is wholly self-contained, reflexive,
nonreferential. Romano's realist necessarily sees the artificiality of form. The
solution is a subterfuge of form even as the novelist uses it to achieve "open
form," which" acknowledge[s] fully that which lies beyond itself, and is greater
than itself, and inclusive of itself" (p. 50). Thus the Venecrings' reflecting
mirror in QUi· ,Mutual FTiend (Ch. 2) is an ancient symbol of mimesis; but
Dickens uses it not to acclaim but to controvert the authodty of mimesis. If
~1e mirror can richly reflect all the surface details of the Veneering gathering,
It cannot image forth anything outside its limited purview-particularly Charlie
Hexam and his world (the lower world) which break in upon the party and
bring the news that begins the novel's real story. And JUSt as Charlie's
art world sugge~t themselves to describe each work under consideration.
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intrusion disrupts the sense of inclusiveness and coherence which the "world"
reflected in the mirror had seemed to give us, so Dickens, after narrowing
down the world to encompass it within form, "punctures," transgresses against,
that form to show the inherent impossibility of enclosing the outer world within

bctWeel
nlfes tr
our res
Ther

the limits of form at all.

1 can

Romano also discovers paradigms of art in Dickens' themes and characterizarion. The river and its duples (mud, sweat, blood) in Our A1utua[ Friend represcnt a "primary reality," that which cannot ever be fully comprehended
but has to do with the origins of life, the life force. Bradley Headstone works
to deDy his origins by rigidly imposing a surface form on his behavior and
appearance, only to have this primary reality erupt and destroy him. Lizzie
H exam, however, is able to make predictions and sec her "pictures" in the
fire (obvious examples of patterning and form) only because she, unlike Bradley,
has stayed close to and acknovi'ledges her o.rigins, the river. That is, only
because she is committed to, aware of, the relatedness of past, present, and
future cm she m3.ke her predictions at all. Two conclusions are to be drawn:
1) if Dickens saw \vith Bradley how dangerous and distorting it was to 5ubordinate instincts, origins, and personal truths to a rigid, artificial surface, he
would hardly nail down all details in his work within a seamlessly coherent
form; 2) thus Dickens' form "confesses," like Lizzie, its dependence on and
relation to something larger than itself. "That is so because the excluded is
precisely the locus of the larger, essential or primary reality on which the
contents arc dependent for their own reality.... It is recognition of this de pendence, rather than verisimilitude, that constitutes the realism of the artistic
whole" (p. 76).
Romano also explores the role of free play in Dickens' language to illustrate his distinctive realism. If Romano sides with l\1arcus and Hillis Miller
in recognizing this free pby, he differs from them in arguing that it exists side
by side with obviously referential language. Thus Clennam's meditation in
concert "with the Sunday bells he hears in "Home" (Little Dorrit) is constructed with language that is simultaneously determined, referential, and shot
through with free play. His word game is determined by the rhythm of the
bells and by their ;'-cSsociated meaning, which is grim and stultifying. Yet
Clcnnam continues filling in words to the rhythm of the bells after they cease
ringing, and the game and his playful tone arc at odds with the prevailing
oppressiyc atmosphere. Dickens, too, sets up predetermined linguistic patterns in
his prose, as through strongly rhythmic parallelism. But if he "fills in with
words a 'pre-existing' rhythmic pattern, as Clennam fills in the strokes of
the bell" (p. 104), there is also in his language a "distinct inappropriateness of
tone" for" the language of the humorless depiction of the dismal city or the
ang-r)' sJrcasm toward its bwmakers, or the language, which follows, of the
gloom;: mediration on past Sundays. The reader w.il1 feel that a linguistic idca
attr:H:ti\"c and pleasing in itself is bcing indulged here ..." (p. 105). On onc
lund. rhen, Dickens' linguistic play is a means of libenting language from what
would otherwise bc opprcssiye form or context; and this delight in language
for its O\\"n sake is the :1fFirmatiyc counterpart to the negative deconstructionist
ethos in his rc:liist aesthetic. On the other hand, the disparity in his work
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between tone and meaning, between reflexive and referential language, punctures the coherence of the text and once again thro"\vs us out upon and heightens
our response to the actual.
There is not sufficient room to summarize the rest of Romano's argument;
I can merely assert that it is a complex, subtle, and closely-knit one. But
there is that sfumato, that obscuring smoke or fog, I mentioned earlier. The
most troublesome obfuscation is Romano's use of the term "reality" itself.
Possibly, in refusing to define the word's precise meaning. Romano is attempting
with his audience what he feels Dickens did with his-through cracks and rents
in his text to throw the reader back out upon that larger world, whatever it may
be. And no doubt, as Romano himself avers, reality can never be adequately
defined or comprehended. Still, one is uneasy with the shifts in Romano's
tenninology. At the outset, "reality" is a formless "sprawl" incapable of
being reduced to or contained \'vit-hin the limits of form. With his discussion
of Lizzie Hexam, reality suddenly becomes related to continuity, a pattern or
form that even implies cause/effect relationships. Finally, in his discussion of
Oliver Twist, reality is equated with a kind of radical freedom: Oliver's character is "shado\vy" and vague because Dickens is reluctant to confine the
innate freedom and mysteriousness of good \vithin the limits of overdetermined
12.l1guage. And this final shift raises additional questions. Is not Quilp, too, an
essentially "shadowy" figure, incapable of being apprehended in terms of verisimilitude? Is evil, then, not free or mysterious in the same way that good,
embodied in Oliver, is? If so, why do Dickens' villains strike us as so much more
forceful, so much less insubstantial, than his heroes?
One misses, also, a discussion of the value of form. That is, if Dickens' fidelity
is to reality above all else, and if reality cannot by definition be contained
within fiction, why are we given fiction at all? Surely part of the answer lies
in Dickens' devout belief that imagination is very real indeed. But what is the
imagination? Is it only a means of perception, as with Paul Dombey, or is
it, a la Coleridge, a shaping force? The dilemma intensifies in Romano's discussion of Oliver Twist. If, on one hand, Dickens is celebrating the freedom
of the real, and if, on the other hand, he forces the "philosophical" reader
through rhetoric and design to see truth, does this mean Dickens denies to the
reader the same freedom and release from design he insists on in his language,
novels, and reality itself?
But sfumato, if it obscures, also means, in painting, " filled with points of light"most apt for Dickens and Reality, which is very much worth having. Romano's
prose is incisive and witty; his textual notes, index, and bibliography are most
useful; and his is a qualification so necessary to a sensitive critic: a genuine
love for lUst subject. Moreover, by positing both coherence and deconstruction
within Dickens' texts, Romano's argument is more complex than those which
opt merely for one or the other. Romano returns to us both the Dickens
profoundly concerned with his world and the Dickens consciously refining his
art. He also returns us to that perhaps unfathomable mystery of the elusive
boundaries between the real and the imaginative. That boundary is still a
Sphinx-Romano has not entirely unravelled the, riddle-but neither is he, unlike
some challengers, devoured.
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The thesis of Alan Mintz's George Eliot & The Novel of Vocation is thllt
Aliddlemarch and Daniel Deronda not only reflect the nineteenth-century obsession \vith work but in fact tum on the dilemmas and possibilities of vocation
and hence inaugurate a new genre: the novel of vocation. This new development,
argues IvIintz, resulted from the century's secularization of the old Protestant
ethic, wherein vocation was a spiritual II calling" integral to man's salvation. Eliot,
of course, was exposed to this ethic through her Evangelical background, but in
her novels she purges vocation of its -dogmatism and substitutes "inteUectual passion" for a heavenly call while retaining vocation's spiritual significance. Thus,
to err in one's choice of vocation, as Farcbrothcr Imows from the beginning,
or to fail in one's vocation, as Lydgate discovers, is wellnigh to lose one's
soul. The potential of vocation, conversely, is its ability simultaneously to satisfy
ambition (or egoism) and benevolence (service to society).
All this is reasonable enough. '~lhence my objection, my Escher or Gestalt
motif? In insisting that all in ]vIiddlemarch revolves around vocation, lVIinti
confounds foreground and background. To assert that Middlemarcb is "principally concerned with the probIcms of middle-class work n (p. 6) is akin to saying
that Austen's novels are principally concerned with marriage. These statements
are true in a sense, But as \iV. J. Harvey (who, significantly, is not cited by
Mintz) has observed, "the theme of vO'cation i~ A1iddle111arch ... is clearly central and yet it is not the theme as such that makes its impact.:... In fact, [it] is a
lowest common denominator, a reduction we make purely for conveniencefrom a number of very different histories" (The Art of George Eliot, 1963, pp.
153-54), Thus l\1intz can allot little space to Dorothea. True, he places her
at the" symbolic center n of the novel: as a woman, she has no direct access
to vocation and thus illustrates the extreme pressures the community can exert
on vocational choice. But what he sees as irony, namely, that this character
at the H symbolic" center "has no profession whatsoever" (p. 60), surely
suggests that he is imposing the wrong framework on the novel. Again, Mintz
is bemused by Eliot's solution to Will Ladislaw's dilemma of "vocational decision": aftcr trying art, politics, and journalism, he is finally rescued through
marriagc to Dorothea, i. e., through "the older means of occupational assistance:
the patronage system" (p. 132). If Eliot's intent is a dissection of nineteenthcentury vocation we should indeed be puzzled. But if we turn to Eliot as
moralist the jarring ~ote disappears: there is a lovely poetic justice in Dorothea's
giving Will a living, for if it were not for Bulstrode's machinations, Will would
have had this l~ving all along. Finally, lVIintz's argument that Eliot's vocational
focus demanded a new mode of characterization, a technique "capable of a
finer concentration on the gradual changes that mark the movement from one
stage of life to another" (p. 56) could surely be explained by other means. Is
not Eliot's characterization part of what one might term
literature of process,
with its roots in Austen and its culmination in Henry James? One could
quibble with other faults-MIntz's tendency not to provide transitions or clear
connections between passages-but one, though minor, is inexcusable: the wellknown Harriet Taylor Mill, wife of John Stuart Mill, is thrice called" Helen"Mill's step-daughter! Cpp. 50-51).
This is not to say that Mintz's work is without merit. Ironically, it is as a
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thorough study of the background of Eliot's novels that his work is chiefly
vruuable. He provides sound discussions of nineteenth-century autobiographies
centered on vocation, of nineteenth-century medicine, and of Eliot's sources
for her vocational theme. As well, Mintz's literary analysis is often perceptive.
He notes, for example, that characters' vocational success may be assessed by
measuring the text they produce (Lydgate's miniseu1e treatise on gout, Casauhon's
fragments) against the one the narrator produces, and the chapter devoted to
Lydgate and Frabrother (Ch. 4) is especially fine. Thus Mintz's work is
worth examining, not only for his discussion of Middlemarch and its background
but for the shoner sections devoted to Daniel Dertmda and to Beatrice Webb
and James Joyce. But, to borrow from Francis Bacon, I would recommend
tasting, not swallowing.
Arthur Pollard's Anthony Trollope does not give us a II new" Trollope, but
that is not Pollard's intent: his work is II an author-guide, going systematically
through Trollope's voluminous output, omitting only the ephemera" (p. ix).
As that" output" includes 47 novels,S collections of short stories, 4 biographical
studies, 4 major travels books, 2 plays, and numerous sketches, Pollard's surveying
it all in approximately 200 pages is no small feat. I do not think Prof. Pollord
would object to my tenning this book journeyman work; and if at times his
prose lapses into the pedestrian, as if groaning under the burden of his task, his
guide will be a most serviceable one for undergraduates or more advanced
students wondering just where to enter to get their feet wet in the considerable waters of Trollope's work. After a brief biographical sketch, Pollard
surveys Trollope's writings by grouping according to theme, length, and, in
some cases, chronology: Irish novels and stories; social criticism novels; the
Barchester chronicles; political novels; II other" longer novels, 1858-70; shorter
novels, 1863-74; the II final phase"; and U miscellaneous "-the Autobiography
plus short stories, travel-books, etc. Pollard begins each chapter with relevant
background (e. g., an examination of the gentry) or an assessment of the novels'
achievement, then examines each novel or work in some, though necessarily not
exhaustive, detail. Plots are summarized, excerpts are quoted, and major characters analyzed to give a sense of the novel's content. His work is thus truly a
guide, not only surveying T rollope's works but directing our eyes toward their
channs, away from their longueurs.
Pollard's survey, then, is complete, informative, and for the most part balanced-though he is at times a bit crusty in his insistence on the U Victorianism n
of Trollope. Most impottant, he achieves what he sets out to do: to
provide a useful: author-guide. I have two suggestions, though. Since the work
is intended for novice Trollopians, a chronological list of Trollope's work
appended to the text would clarify the order of publication that is sometimes
obscured by Pollard's groupings. Secondly, because the reader must presendy
mow in which novel a character appears to look him or her up, an index
listing for characters' names would help ,the amateur to avoid getting lost in
that Derby-Day multitude of Trollope's creations.
LINDA

University of Missouri-Rolla
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Co11t1tlunities of Women: An Idea in Fiction by Nina Auerbach. Cambridge,
Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1978. Pp. 222. $11.50.

Madness and Sexual Politics in the Feminist Novel: Studies in Bronte, Woolf,
Lessing and Atwood by Barbara Hill Rigney. Madison and London: Universiry of Wisconsin Press, 1978. Pp. 148. $15.00.
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On the cover of Nina Auerbach's fascinating book, three disembodied hands
reach out to meet. Crimson shapes against an orange background, they look at
:first like shadow-animals cast by hands against ,a wall: lobster claws or wolves.
This trompe-l'oeil graphic is an apt visual analog of Auerbach's unsettling critical
imagination and the bold conclusions of her book. Communities of Women
should become a special classic of feminist criticism, a book which testifies as
strongly to the personal energies of its author as to the vitality of the sisterly
intellectual communities, from Feminist Studies to the Radcliffe Institute, which
nurtured ,its debates.
Auerbach takes as her subject the fictional treatment of the collective power
of women grouped in the family, the sohool, the community and the state.
She both incorporates and challenges the new feminist historiography about the
special powers and moral strengths of what Carroll Smith-Rosenberg has called
"the female world of love and ritual"; for in Auerbach's analysis the separate
society inevitably evolves towards the values and tactics of the male power
elite. Alternating between extended close analyses of several major novels, and
stimulating references to a wide range of related literary and historical texts,
Auerbach shows how the female community moves out of its passive and
sanctified domestic enclosure into history, until Muriel Spark's "Brodie set"
becomes a micro-Fascist brigade, and the militant women of international radical
feminism (in Monique Wittig's Les Guerilleres and Ti-Grace Atkinson's Amazon
Odyssey) take on all' the trappings of male power. In assuming public authority,
in organizing and arming for its heroic quest, and in consciously mythologizing
its own origins, this Amazonian collective finally U destroys the possibility of a
female world as a sheltered shared enclave whose values are private and unique" (p. 190).
Auerbach calls her mixed "community of novels" an "appropriate oddity"
(p. 30). In a chapter called "Waiting Together: Two Families," she boldly
pairs the matriarchies of Pride and Prejudice and Little Women, a reading that
convinces us of Alcott's seriousness and pathos without reducing Austen to
domestic comedy. She bridges the worlds of Cranford and Villette by suggesting
that Gaskell has as her model the extraordinary sisterhood of Haworth Parsonage, which she would later document in her Life of Charlotte Bronte. Again
we are made to see the paradoxical power of the female community; Villette
is a small state ruled by women whose administrative skills are professional rather
than matriarchal, and Lucy Snowe is educated in "the art of ruling" as well
as in her own emotions. When Auerbach turns to Gissing and James, and the
male "vision of the female community as an equivocal source of power,"
the book loses some of its momentum; the "odd women" and the Bostonians
lack the passiona.te coherence, and the unpredictability, of the communities ima-
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gined by women. But the concluding chapter is fresh, surprising, and courageous.
By choosing to examine lVluriel Spark's astringent modernist fables of the female
will to power and to cite Simone de Beauvoir's "lugubrious analysis of the
fantasy of a feminine' counter-universe'" (p. 183), rather than to celebrate
the new separatist sisterhoods of Marge Piercy, Mary Daly and Adrienne Rich,
Auerbach makes an ideological, as well as a critical commitment.
It is in the al"ca of ideology that this book will arouse controversy. Auerbach
concludes with a nostalgia for the "individuality" of the little '.vamen, and "the
humanly interdependent courtesy of Cranford," the substantiality of nineteenthcentury realism and nineteenth-century heroines. Undoubtedly some will find
the direction of her argument pessimistic, and will protest that a different
selection of texts would reveal a more self-aware and hopeful feminist bonding, as
in the novels of Gail Godwin, Lisa Althcr, M. F. Beal, and Fay Weldon. From
a historical perspective, the picture of a female community only recently invaded
by violence, ambition, and ego seems inaccurate; the suffragists of 1910 perceived
as vividly as Ti-Grace Atkinson that military discipline was the price to be paid
for political power.
Yet we can go to other sources for history and ideology. Auerbach has a
profoundly literary imagination; indeed, history as she uses it often seems to be a
kind of serial novel with wonderful characters. What she gives 'lIS in this book
is the vision of a female community as ,an organic entity, endowed with a consistency of purpose that is almost mythic. These matriarchal families, villages,
schools, have an uncanny power to sustain themselves, to attract and annihilate
male invaders, that seems to derive from their sublimation of sexual and economic
appetite. Poor and hungry, they have channelled their immense consuming
energies into strategies of survival. Auerbach's delight in paradox, her interest
in startling textual juxtapositions, and the "elegant economy" (to borrow Cranford's highest praise) of her prose, constantly shal{es ideas into new relations,
and leads us to think about familiar texts in new ways. Not everyone will
agree with her conclusions, but her book reminds us how stubbornly and
rewardingly the feminist critic remains her own woman, whatever communities
she joins.
The long title of Barbara Hill Rigney's short bool{ sums up most of its
content.", (except that the feminist novels are four in number: Jane Eyre, Mrs.
Dalloway, Tbe Four-Gated City, and Surfacing; and the studies are Laingian).
Rigney's thesis is that madness in the novel is "connected to the female social
condition" (p. 7) and is an understandable response to the punishing logos of an
insanely patriarchal society. Her model for tIlls analysis throughout is R. D.
Laing, whose views on oppression, and attacks on Freudian theory, traditional
psychotherapy, the family, and the state, have some parallels to feminist ideology,
but hardly constitute a feminist psychology. While Rigney acknowledges some
of Laing's limitations, and especially his romanticization of insanity, she nonetheless makes unquestioning use of his terminology and his definitions. Laing's
poetic notion of schizophrenia as the survival strategy of the "broken-hearted,"
the quest of a split personality for the wholeness whioh a deeply divided society
tries to prevent, is metaphor rather than medicine. This is what Rigney means
when she claims that "each novelist indicates tfuat women in particular suffer
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from more or less obvious fnrms of schizophrenia, being constantly torn between
male society's prescriptions for female behavior, their ov;;n tendencies toward
the internalization of these roles, and a nostalgia for some lost, more authentic
self" (p. 119). "\Vhile this casual psyqhiatric labeUing cannot harm fictional
characters, such as Clarissa Dalloway, it is disturbing to think that real women
struggling with such basic human dilemmas might be termed "schizophrenic."
Rigney's refusal to question Laing's authority, to seek alternative perspectives" to
ask why Doris Lessing, for example, turns to Laingian ideology after lvlarxism
and before Sufism, deprives her book of a certain kind of psychological and
cultural credibility. In her dependence on Laing, she still seems tied to a
patriarchal tradition, albeit a counter-cultural one; the recent work of Jean
Baker Miller and Nancy Chodorow, among other feminist psychologists, would
be a useful corrective to Laing's excess.
Fortunately, her readings of these four novels take her beyond Laing to some
exciting hypothesis about the female psyche. Although Jane Eyre is by now a
standard text for feminist critics, and Bertha Mason has been frequently written
about as a prototype for the "mad wife" in women's fiction, Rigney has some
new things to say about the novel's equation of chastity and sanity, and about
Jane's search for the mother-principle. Rigney argues that while none of the
female characters in Jane Eyre is an adequate mother-figure for Jane, she achieves spiritual contact with a cosmic "moon-mother" who is associated with
chastity but also with female consciousness. In identifying ,vit:h this maternal
spirit of self-respect, Jane unconsciously rejects "the role of motherhood for
herself as being yet another threat to autonomy" (p. 36).
When Rigney examines the quest for the" metaphoric mother" (especially ill
her excellent chapter on IVlargaret Atwood) the Laingian apparatus fades into the
background, and "\ve see a uniquely-structured female literary psychology, with
its own symbolism of nature, mirrors, and doubles. .As she points out, the
existing literature on the image of the doppelgange1' is inadequate for these works
by ,vomen writers; her treatment .of the double as "the recognition of the
tragedy of one's own fragmentation" (p. 10) provides a helpful feminist reinterpretation. Occasionally Rigney misrea,ds her texts; she thinks that St. John
Rivers wants marriage to Jane to be sexless, and that Richard Dalloway "agrees"
that Clarissa should sleep alone. But such lapses are minor; overall, Rigney's
view of sexual withdrawal as an initial phase in a psychic process leading to
re-integration, authenticity, and survival, is moving :<nd persuasive. Like Auerbach's phenomenology of the female literary community, Rigney's analysis of the
feminist psychic quest should generate lively and productive controversies.
ELAINE SHOWALTER

Douglass College, Rutgers University
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Emerson and the Orphic Poet in America by R. A. Yoder. Berkeley, Los Angeles,
London: University of California Press, 1978. Pp. xvi + 256. $13.50.
Emerson and Literary Change by David Poner. Cambridge, Mass. and London:
Harvard University Press, 1978. Pp. xiii
248. $15.00.

+

"In spite of much literature on the subject," Stephen Whicher noted in 1957,
"an adequate account of Emerson's theory and practice of poetry remains to
be published." The concluding phrase undoubtedly exempts the pioneer studies
of Carl Strauch, a lifework already well-known at the time. But Whicher states
the case, as does Hyatt Waggoner's review of Emerson's achievement as a
poet (Emerson as Poet, 1974), that makes the publication of these books by
R. A. Yoder and David Porter so significant. Probably because even in a work
as recent as Waggoner's Emerson's achievement as a poet is considered modestconsensus of a century of criticism, the poetry not to be compared with the
high achievement of the prose-the poetry has not been engaged for what it so
obviously is in view of Emerson's belief in the primacy of the Imagination: the
focal, deepest ground of his life. Poetry always is for a poet, and Emerson, as
he claimed, was a poet whose work as a poet, both Yoder and Porter demonstrate, is as central to American poetry as his work as a thinker (culture hero)
has always been believed to be in respect to American thought. Yoder and Porter
depicit different Emersons-at best, complementary Emersons-but they agree on his
centrality as a poet and on the continuing centrality of just those issues (for a poetics
inevitably expresses religious, philosophical, epistemological, and ethical concerns)
that Emerson probed in his poetry. It would be enough to say .in praise of Yoder
and Porter that by revivifying Emerson's poetry in their readings of the drama of
its ,deep allegories of Imagination they compel us to re-read it. (And on
this reading I find in it more excellences than they allow.) But as an Emersonian
and as one of the "anonymous scholars" Yoder mentions, I also wish to say
that these books are noteworthy because they acknowledge their foundations
in earlier work and renew in terms of perspectives scholarship and criticism
have since brought forward the inquiries that in our time have established
Emerson as a "central man." Not since Bishop's Emerson on the Soul have we
had work of such importance.
What matters here is not an upward reassessment of the poetry but an appreciation of Emerson's profound comminnent to poetry (Imagination) and
its central place as the generative source of his work. Emerson himself spoke
the critical consensus (and as Porter shows, the very thing that pressed him to
liberate the Imagination in prose) when he said, "I am born a poet, of a low
class without doubt yet a poet." He lrnew-and we know-that his "singing"
was Ie, husky.'" Even so he insisted that it was his "nature & vocation"
to be a poet, and in the high sense of "perceiver & dear lover of the harmonies that Me in the soul & in matter, & specially of the correspondences
between these & those." Here perceiver speaks for the Imagination, and correspondences for the metaphysical faith that early in Emerson's career assured
him of "'harmonies"-the spiritual vision, the transcendence represented by
the binary structure and conversion plot of his poems, the vision soon
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enough challenged by his experience. Both Yoder and Porter begin here,
with the recognition, a..<; Yoder says, that the initial design of Emerson's poems
is "founded in the order of correspondence" and that this design "implies the
easy victory of imaginath-c insight over ordinary, mundane powers." And
beginning here, both follow the development charted by Whichcr-the descent
from imaginative heights and assurance to the mid-world of scepticism and endless
accommodation-to arrive, however, at different conclusions and different Emersonlan traditions in poetry.
Yoder tells this story of transcendence and descendence in terms of the Orphic
poct-figure so conspicuous in Emerson's ·work, .and though the second part
of his book is devoted to the poems he tells the story chiefly in terms of
ideas, as an intellectual historian. He does not approach the poems as closely
as Porter. 111eir llrer(ll activity does not concern him as much as the influences
on thcm (for example, George Herbert on the early poems) and the legacy
thy bequeathed to American poets. Telling ~he story twice, first in an account
of the development of Emerson's Orphic mind, he recalls for us a great tradition
and the more immediate context of European romanticism th:!t nurtured Emerson's Orphic aspiration and subsequently sustained his Orphic compromise.
Emerson's Orphic career is the story of the Poet-hero (the American Scholar,
as Porter sho\vs, for the fable is everywhere in Emerson's work) who believes
in the "conversation of the world." He believes, as Emerson says in "The
American Schobr," that "as the world was pla.stic and fluid in the hands of
God, so is it ever," and the poCt, the godlike man, may give it "his signet
and form." He is Orphic by virtue of being possessed by this" heroic passion,"
the passion to conform things to his thought, to invest "dust and stones with
humanity, and [make] them words of Reason." And he is Orphic, too, by virtue
of his belief in the sovereign power of the Imagination. In the conclusion
to the paragraph in Nature (1836) from which the previous quotations are
taken, Emerson says: "The Imagination may be defined to be the use which
the R~ason makes of the material \vodd."
Now the Emerson who believed this is clearly a. Promethean figure serving
revolutionary ends. He is the exalted early Emerson who, under stress experience (a word underlined by the essay of that name), yielded revolution for
revebtion (song), external for internal apocalypse, spiritual summits for the
mundane mid-world. The later Emerson, who accepts the "titmouse dimension," is the faithful sceptic who conforms to nature and seeks the answers to
her riddles, He has yielded the vertical ascent, and his humbler task is to
reconcile or balance the polarities of the horizontal, the actual prudential world,
Orpheus-PromcrhetlS, Osman, Saadi, the Plato of Representati'ue Men, Merlinthe sequence of these figures in Emerson's work tells of the descent of Orpheus,
of Emerson's defeat bv nature.
This defc:1t, according to Yoder, is the Emersonian legacy, and in a compensatory way he sees it as a "icrory, hence as a't\1hwble legacy. He explains:
Because America has always had great expectacions of a sublime and
philosophicallitcr:lture, its poets have accepted the tradition that OrpJieus,
thc first pact, was the "'hole or Uniyersal j\IIan, and rhey ha\'c tried to
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live up to Eme=n's magnificent fable of the Orphic poet that promises
freedom, revolution, and transcendence. But fable meets fact, and in
the meeting progeny discover the severer limitations of their kind. The
key to Emerson's prolific fatherhood is that, having made impossible demands on poets, he does not abandon them when they cannot do what
he asks; his own example offers the ideal of a lesser Orpheus, who understands II the precise fact of our condition .•.."

,,
I

And so Yoder gives us an Emersonian tradition of poetry of the dark, at the
edge; a poetry of qualified idealism and limitation whose chief practitioners are
Dickinson, Stephen Cranc, Robinson, Frost, Stevens, and. Ammons. He pu15 in
eclipse the brighter Orphic Emersonian tradition of Whitman, Pound, Williams, Stevens (in others' reckoning), Hart Cranc, and (I would add with
qualifications in regard to idealism) Olson and Duncan.
And Porter? In giving us the fullest account we have had of Emerson's
poetics and the struggle for "aesthetic liberation II it involved, he traverses a
similar course from transcendence to descendence only to find in Emerson's
descendentalism values wholly overlooked by Yoder. WhBre Yoder's work may
be said to support the literary establishment, Porter's may be said to subvert it.
And this is in keeping witlh his fresh view of Emerson as preeminently an artist
concerned with formal mateus. As artist, Emerson subverted the literary establishment of his time out of vital imaginative necessity. He had to shatter the
formal constraints of his own poems-those coverting mechanisms, with their
upward, transcending, abstracting plots-and discover for himself the imaginative
possibilities of the spaciousness of prose.
No one has told so exactly the faults of Emerson's poetry and showed why
we so much appreciate his prose, the poetry of the prose, to cite a chapter title
in Waggoner's book, where Waggoner acknowledges that Emerson's prose is
"more imaginative" than JUs verse. Yes, more imaginative. For even when
the poems enact the correspondential vision and do the necessary Emersonian
work of turning U adversity to advantage," they warp away from life, life leaks
out. I borrow Porter's phrases anp his measure of poetry-the very measure that
:finally moved Emerson to liberate his imagination (lower-case: no longer in the
service of Reason), to turn it back!down from its translation of life intO
ideas, to life. (In this context, consider Williams' insistence on descent ana. 'flO
ideas but in things, and the Pound-Olson insistence on image over symbol.)
Liberation is in this descent, and if descent is the defeat of one kind of
aspiration it is also the victory of another. The extremity that proposed this
redirection is evident in the polarity of ascent-descent and in the view that
poetry is higher than prose, the one a vehicle of higher Truth, the other the
vehicle of mundane truths. Emerson himself believed this "genteel" view-that
poetry is limited to "poetic" subjects-and so in moving from it he rehearsed the
continuing struggle between the genteel-spiritual and liberated-experiential traditions that for Porter represent the discontinuity of American poetry.
Experience is the crux. Nothing shows better Emerson's vocation as poet
than his detennination to liberate the Imagination in its behalf, to fasten it, as
he said of words, to visible things, to give over the vertical (the correspondence
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of lower to higher) for the horizontal (the correspondence of language and thing,
function and form), to forego remembering and mental deliverance for an active
exploration of experience, to :find imaginative means-among them, speech, the
open form of the essay-equal to both the present activity of thought and the
richness of the actual world. Where once Emerson dreamed the dream of
consciousness that informs his early poetry-he would eat the apple of the
world, swallow it-now he would marry it, possess its energy and life by coupling
·with it.
Porter speaks of this achievement as "a breakthrough into spaciousness"
and so his alignment of Emerson and Charles Olson is not unexpected. Some
may find it-and the reassessment of Emerson that makes it possible-shocking,
but it is just: "Olson and Emerson a century apart called for a new reconcilation of the world and the language in which it is to be experienced." And
with Olson as a touchstone, we lmow that Porter's version of the Emersonian
legacy will diverge from Yoder's. It does, but with qualification. For open
form, he believes, led to a disturbing "atomization":
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The great irony is that, ill opening up poetic space, [Emerson] intended
to demonstrate " the cheerful hint" in all things "of the immortality of
our essence." ... 'Vith the disappearance of that faith, what remained
was an open form cro.wded with intractable experience, manifesting
more clearly than ever ~he multitudiness of experience and the failure
of the idealistic philosophy. The form was capable of a great gathering
of life without any certain way to understand it.
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The failure of the idealistic philosophy is indeed the - issue. But Porter is
himself not yet liberated from irs assumptions. That he finds in the open form
of Emerson's work Ie the first glimpses of the wasteland" and feels compelled to
understand (to put experience in a certain framework, as in Understanding
Poetry) indicates this. He is right to choose Olson as a gauge of the poetic
enterprise, but he has yet to fully appreciate the open universe poets like Olson
inhabit and the extent to which this has liberated the imagination and permitted
what Williams called "unbound thinking." If Porter's interpretation is sound,
and I think it is, then Emerson would have approved Hart Crane's concern with
only the absolute nature of experience and preferred to understanding Williams'
concern with thinking wit!:; the poem and in the writing living in the moment
that he truly lives. Had Porter carried his study, as Kenneth Burke would say.
to the end of the line, he would have had to consider texts like Whitehead's
Pmcess and Reality which underwrite postmodern open poetics and provide a
post-\vasteland generation of poets with another definition and assurance of
meaning. WL:{!h is to say, as Hart Crane said, that we need not succumb to the
"\vastcland" nor give privileged statue to a poetry of despair, of the dark, of the
edge.
It d~s not detract from the merit of these studies to note their incompleteness.
How is it neither Yoder nor Porter treats Fenollosa, who brought so much
of Emerson's poetics over into significant use in the modern era? Again, how
ls it Robert Duncan is omitted, tIlls poet of liberated imagination whose Orphic
determination is as conspicuous as Emerson's and whose work, founded on
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other assumptions, has not become that of a "lesser Orpheus lI? And how is it
a scholar 50 thorough as Yoder has not considered a book so much to his purpose and to the Orphic revitalization of language, Gerald Bruns' i\lodcm Poetry
and tbe Idea of Language?
But who isn't incomplete? It is only fair to add that these excellent srudies
may provoke the poets of the open tradition to recognize Emerson as the father
of the" libertarian aesthetics," and every bit as important to them as YVhitl11an.
Perhaps the next edition of The Poetics of the New American PoetfY will include Emerson.
SHERMAN FA VL

Tbe University of Iowa

The Grim Phoenix: Rec011SH7lcting TbO'lflaS Pyncbon by William M. Plater.
Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978. Pp. xvii
268.

+

$12.50.

For the amateur reader, baffled or bemused by Thomas Pynchon's "multiplexity" (Plater's word), there is no aid or comfort in this new study, 'which
cCI111pounds Pynchon's difficulties \vith several of its o\vn. Such a reader
would be well-adyiscd to return to Tony Tanner's early essays in Cit)' of
lVorJs, or to Edward Mendelsohn's edition of essa\'s in the TwemietlJ-Cemury
Views series, or, fClute de 711ieu:r, to Joseph Shd'e's guidebook to Pynchon's
novels, published by the \tVarner Library. Professionals and diehard specialists,
to say nothing of thesc interested in shifts of current critical \vinds, will however
find much intclligent analysis here, though their interest may tum to exasperation
before the last page is turned. Plater's book tends to reflect, not to reflect on,
the Yllrions tics and preoccupations of its subject, and there is no small amount of
subliminal spccial pleading. i'vioreoYer, since Pynchon's 'work presents a contcmporary critical challenge of some magninJde, containing as it does at least
one no\'cl which most of irs critics agree cannot be analyzed in any coherent
way, Platcr's choice of focus is a significant index to what h:1ppens in contcmpor:ll'y criticism of contcmporary litcrature when text explic:1tion is rcnounccd
before it bcgins.
Thc mcthod here is POst-suucruralist. As thc subtitlc suggests, ho\\'c\'cr, thc
tcchniquc employcd does not deconstruct or dismantle 01' eng:1gc in other forms
of diycstiturc, but instead "reconstructs" the author's work \:Vby it should
require reconstruction is a question Pbter docs not eX:1ccly an~-wer, but (hc
implic:1tion is th:1t Pynchon's wor1.: lics in ruins. juJging from Plater's tl'xrure
:tnd tone, 1 t;lkc him to mea.n tll;lt he rc~or~:mizes the organii'.:niol1<; and ~\·~tenh
found in P\'nchon so th:1t the\' 111:1\' be eX:lI;incd, if not u'ldmatck anakzc~l (for
rcasons I ~i,all get to Shortly)'. Tilc s\-srcms tlut 3rc "rcconstnl~rcd" <:1re tho:,c
hmiliar to a.1l ~of Pynchon;s rC:1ders: ' the \Vitt!:!cnstcini:m "clse"; S\-stclll:1tic
tourism, allicd with lllet:1phy~ical and :1cnl:11 coJoni:llism; enrrop~' ;'ll1ti sy~,e!Tl<;
dcgcncLltion; pa.ranoia amI the ul1ccrt:J.inry principle. Pbtcr aSSU!llC~ a u:lsic
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familiarity in his reader with each of these. What he does is to find the
order in the order of the fiction, for" Pynchon makes his world comprehensible
by showing -how various things are related, how there are parallel existences,
and, possibly, how there is reconciliation" (xiv). So there is an "order" in
the fiction to reconstruct or reconstrue, critically. But perhaps not. "The
only thing the reader can do with the facts of Pynchon's novels is to try
to impose some order on all the clicks and whistles, all the noise" (14). If
the order is imposed, then it must be the critic's, not the author's. Where is
the order to be reconstructed, then, and whose is it, Plater's or Pynchon's? By
contradicting himself, Plater recapitulates the typical Pynchon double-bind situation, Oedipa 1\1aas's in particular. Elsewhere, he examines Pynchon's entropic
processes, seeing him as a visionary pessimist, the latest in line of a series
of dark Romantics obsessed with power and madness.
Combining notions concerning entropy and information theory, Plater reduces
the characters in the fiction, and in some sense the reader of the fiction, to utter
helplessness. "Regard'less of where they are and what illusions of history the
anarchists may harbor, they are all enclosed within the system of time that
is smoothly, steadily winding down to an anarchy, the undifferentiated chaos of
no time" (41). (( Since criteria for finite measurement do not exist, uncertainty relations are all that can be known and they are expressions of the
interdependence of continuities and discontinuities" (101). "As a force of
equilibrium, love is another name for entropy and dying may thus be viewed
as an act of self-love" (139). The helplessness apparent here is emphasized even
more in the chapter on paranoia, where Pynchon's "ominous," " mysterious," and
" hidden" elite i9 given the credit for laying waste to the earth. Statements of
this sort have become standard in writings on Pynchon and to some degree in
muCh current criticism; they are the critical equivalents to the loss of the self,
the erasure of the subject, and the substitution of the system for the individual.
As far as Pynchon's tone is concerned, this kind of analysis is inaccurate. The
reader senses the discrepancy each time Plater offers a quotation from the
novels: though the literal meaning may be what he says it is, the tone-as is
typical in Pyuchon-is often manically jolly, wisecracking or comic. This tone
is disregarded as if it were not significant information. Pynchon's use of
entropy theory is examined but his jokes aren't, ,rooting Pynchon in Rilke and
Nietzsche but not in Scott Fitzgerald or Captain Marvel or Motbra, the supposed
basis of his next novel. The appalling humorlessness of this book makes
Pynchon into a grim Puritan doomsdayer, damned by his Calvinism into a
kind of mechanistic apocalypticism. But to analyze Pynchon's tone is to recognize that to some degree the humor produces a dissociated effect, as if the
situations were not imaginary but fantastical, and the characters neither "real"
nor believable.
Plater perceives this disjunction but does nothing with it. He admits that
most of Pynchon's characters are unbelievable, citing the sailor Mehemet in V.
as one of Pynchon's "few believable characters." Elsewhere he observes that in
this fiction (( people and places are incidental to systems and forces." If one cannot believe in the characters enmeshed in the systems, then what is being
distorted in the systems themselves? Plater does not concern himself with the
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number of Pynchon's characters or their depthlessness. He tries to assert
that there is a concern for caring among some of them, but as for love, it is
another name for entropy, and in any case cannot take place between two- or
one-dimensional characters. The difference between Pynchon's cartoon characters
and his more embodied ones, such as the Polders in Gra·vity's RiJinb()lU), is,
however, not fully explored.
Plater does not take on the question of whether these unbelievable characters
inhabit some unrealistic variety of fiction, such as allegory or fable. He does,
however, examine both uncertainty and paranoia at length. Paranoia, that disease of overinterpretation and mania, "may be the closest we can come to
naming any theory that explains Pynchon's fictional world" (189). Paranoia
assumes connectedness and bonding, of s·ecrct signs and hidden order and one's
own victimization. Its result is the feeling of helplessness, and intelligence and
abstraction are its helpmates and cohorts. It is odd, considering Plater's use
of Freud in his discussion of the death-instinct, that Freud's more plausible
theory of paranoia is never once mentioned. In Plater, paranoia is all of
system and works from the top downward. No mention is made of the idea
thalt paranoia is the result of blocked, converted, and projected Eros for one's
own sex. In this discussion, it is always "out there," in some "grand design
we cannot quite see" (190). That Plater never once inquires into the classical
psychoanalytic basis of paranoia means that he has no way to connect paranoia wiJth fantasy. The entire subject, since it is cut off from the body, becomes
instantly mystified in "grand designs." To fill in the gaps would raise the
presumably taboo subject of homosexual themes in Pynchon's work, which
have become more obvious with each novel. Plater takes Pynchon toO much
at Pynchon's word, and accepts his explanations as proper -and thus sees the
military-corporate sources for feelings of persecution but not the sexual-erotic
ones. It is thus no accident that Pynchon's characters are disembodied.
Similarly, the discussion of uncertainty in this book relies on Pynchon and
H·eisenberg and leaves the topic in an intellectual aether, where it generally stays in post-modernist criticism. Again, the result is a feeling of helplessness: "the more we zero in on dream and fantasy, the less we mow about
reality, or what passes for reality" (115). So there's no point in doing much
of anything. But to what degree is the uncertainty principle dragged in by
Pynchon and Plater to forestall commitments to action that one is too "cool"
or frightened to take? Consequently, the Counterforce in Gra·vity's Rainbow
is also a system and is l< an inherent failure." But all this is based on Pynchon's
universal metaphysic of control and power, where only absolutes have any
lasting validity. The uncertainty principle ffi3Y well be a theory employed to
justify ironical stances toward others in caring and love, for fear of revealing
the hidden self, or the vacant self. By positing uncertainty as a purely mentalistic
function, unrelated to voyeurism, for example, Plater once again helps to dislocate the entire subject.
" ... Pynchon has prevented definitive perceptions by forcing critics into
uncertainty relations with his observable world and thus into distracting complexity" (132). "In ,a sense, Gra·v-ity's Rainbow has happened before in V. and
Tbe Crying of Lot 49, but Pynchon's latest novel is beyond comparison" (234).
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There is a kind of authoritarianism here tlhar places the problematic areas of
Pynchon's fiction just beyond reach. It is not that Gravity's Rainbow is too
long or complex to analyze, but that Pynchon has protected its true core by
means of intellect and intellectual performance, much as Eliot did in The Waste
Lemd. For Plater final authority is of course the auvhor. Pynchon's cosmic
mastermind has supposedly blocked criticism, but that process only occurs when
the critic accepts the author's terms as the only genuine ones for discussion.
Criticism cannot be said to be wholly responsible if it does not critique the
author's concepts along with his characters ,and plots. By failing to analyze
the local, as opposed to the metaphysical, origins of paranoia and uncertainty,
by omitting any discussion of humor or Pynchon's remorseless sadism, Plater
leaves Pynchon much as he was before the analysis began, with paranoia and
systems floating high in the air, out of reach, like the rocket before its fall. This
book is cult-criticism, and for all its ,care and intelligence, it bears the same
relation to Pynchon's work as apologetics do to sacred texts.
CHARLES BAXTER

Wayne State University
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One of the features distinguishing" modernist" from II post-modernist" poetry
is the attitude that their respective practitioners take toward H personality."
As early as Aristotle, the tendency of minds to combine differently in terms
of similarity, difference, cause and effect, and contiguity served as a basis for
determining personality, and earlier, dialect, vocublary, idiom, and name offered
ocher insights into character. The very difficulty in separating these elements
led critics at the start of the twentieth century to equate personality and
style .s.o that one's style was one's personality. Yet, with the advent of Imagism
and more clearly with T. S. Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919),
equations of personality and style began to change. For Eliot, great art was
"not tl1e expression of personality, but: an escape from personality." and in this
depersonalization, "art may be said to approach the condition of science."
But, Eliot adds, " only those "\"ho have personality ...know what it means to want
to escape from [it}." The" progress of the artist" is, in such terms, an almost
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Darwinian" continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality," For
Ezra Pound, the process of extinction began" in a boole called Personae I, (1909),
with his" casting off, as it were, complete masks of the self in each poem." It
consisted, as William Carlos vVilliams ·was to say in an essay on Marianne Moore
(1925), in "wiping soiled words or cutting them clean out, removing the
aureoies that have been pasted about them or taking them bodily from greasy
contexts."
By 1929, Eliot was recommending to younger poets the II transparency" of Dante's
poetry to the" opacity" of Shakespeare's, adding that" the language of each great
English poet is his own language; the language of Dante is the perfection of a
common language." Yct three years later-perhaps influenced by Niels Bohr's
complementaries theory-Eliot is willing to see in Shakespearc's writing the
instrument of perception wed inevitably to perception and seemingly incompatible perceptions representative of aspects of truth \vithout necessarily entering
into direct conflict. Distinguishing Shakespeare's work from that of lesser writers,
Eliot rcmarks that great poets generate a sense of U one significant, consistent, and
dcveloping personality." Certainly, it was the" opacity" of the writer that, by
the end of the decade, the younger poets embraced, In" The Two Audens"
(1939), Delmore Schwartz viewed the very poetic medium to which the young
Eliot would sacrifice personality as an interplay of a writer's Frcudian id and
ego, and by the early fifties, Charles Olson portrayed it as physiological: «the
head, by way of the ear, to the syllable/the heart, by way of the breath, to the
line." Whatever the reasons of the "opacity," the choices of the «postmodernist" poets became less those momentary decisions that Spren Kierkegaard
identified with art than the life choices he called ethical. As W, D. Snodgrass
was to say in 1959, pacts of his generation "who had gone so far in criticism
and analysis so as not to be able to turn back and be innocent again" were left
with the depths of their sincerity: their "only hope as artists" was to ask
thcl11selyes continually, U Am I writing what I really think? , .."\Vhat I cannot help
thinking? "
Karl Malkoff's Escape from tbe Self and Arthur Oberg's Atlodern A1Jle1'ic(1n
LY7'ic deal with the widc implications of these attitudes toward" transparency"
in art as they come to illustrate a general "shared sense of man's capacity to
experience himself and the world." At the same time, Joel Conarroe's J olm
Berryman: An Introduction to the Poetry and G:UT Q. Arpin's TI.le Poetry of
John Berryman focus on the implications of willed opacity ,15 it affects the
development of a single writer. For Mallwff, "escape from the self" begins with
T. E. Hulme's rccognition that" Ollr principal concern ... at the prcsent momcnt
should be the re-establishment of the temper or disposition of mind which can
look at a gap or chasm without shuddering." J\·lalkoff connects this recognition to Nomlan O. Bro,,-n's btcr assertion that" mcaning is not in things bur
in between; in the iridescence, the interpby; in the interconnections; at the
intersections, at the crossroads." Bv the dc\-ices of simi brit\', differencc, cause
and effect, and contiguity that Aristotle idcntified with - pcrsonalir>', these
"gaps" or " bctweens" are consciously obscured into a "fixcd point of \'iew."
Far from bcing "nonnaI,-' this fixed point of yic\\' is "as much acquired as is
the means of recognizing the letters of the alphabet, or of following duono-
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logical narrative." For Brown, Marshall McLuhan, and other contemporaries,
including" modernist" poets, man's present task becomes that of ridding "connectives" and allowing things to mean freely by simple placement. Pound's
Cantos offers "meaning" in a discontinuous flow of placements in the mind of a
single individual. Williams' Paterson reinterprets this effort toward meaning
as communal and centers it on place. Olson's AlIaximus sequence weds both
techniques into a space/time continuum.
Malkoff's approach works well for Olson and writers of the Pound-vVilliams
generation, but it begins to founder as it treats Robert Lowell, Sylvia Plath, and
John Berryman. Here, Mallwff's making interchangeable "personality," "self,"
"ego," and" Freudian ego" crashes against their efforts to escape the tyranny
of the Freudian ego for an interplay of id and ego that Freud himself identifies
with" personality" and" self." Consequently, their efforts do not quite eqm.te to
the attempts of their predecessors to extinguish personality. Rather than a
sequence exhibiting Freudian concepts and illustrative of Lowell's belief that, in
the coUapses of sectarian religion, "Freud seems the only religious teacher,"
Life Studies is seen simplistically as a long poem whose unmediated sections,
changes of style, points of view, modes of expression, and contents signal its
affinities to Pound's Cantos. Plath's" Daddy," "Lady Lazarus," and "Fever
103°" become communal reinterpretations of Lowell's ,individual testing of
boundaries :md, in its effort to be an interior version of Olson's space/time
continuum, Berryman's Dream Songs offers "nothing less than a head-on assault
on the notion of a single, consistent personality." Malkoff extends this interest
in " transparency" to the writings of Allen Ginsberg, the Black Mountain poets,
the New York poets, the Deep Imagists, the New Black poets, A. R. Ammons,
and Mark Strand, where, again, cases for complementarities may be made.
Malkoff also treats briefly the work of Theodore Roethke, Randall Jarrell,
Delmore Schwartz, and Karl Shapiro as attempts to assert rather than escape self.
Failing to perceive his own clear" fixed point of view/' Malkoff completes his
study \vith an attack on the egoism of certain critical schools and praise for the
maverick "escapes" of Walter Ong, David Bleich, Walter Slatoff, and Stanley
Fish.
In his study of the contemporary lyric, Oberg is less interested than Malkoff
in presenting procnlstean overvie"ws. Oberg limits his discussions to the work
of only four poets-Lowell, Berryman, Robert Creeley, and Placil-and concentrates on only "the short or compressed poem, the poem likely to express the
thoughts and feelings of some 'I,' the song, the love poem." Even here, he
seems less interested in the formal elements of lyrics than in their content. In
the divorce of the lyric poem from music, he offers none of the standard
structuring substitutes: he has recourse neither to the New Critics' belief that
lyrics are improvisations on paradoxes or tensions nor to an extension of Arthur
Schopenhauer's idea that music closely resembles the rhythm of thought so that,
as modern ly.rics adhere to the contours of thought, they indirectly approximate
music, nor even to the more popular notions among contemporary writers that
the formal elements of lyrics are physiological and somehow related to heartbeat or breath or para-linguistic and related to idiolect. Rather, what constitutes
the distinguishing characteristic of lyrics for Oberg is their insistences "on ad-
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dressing the intimate' you! in us." In the case of Lowell, this effort is part of
a "distinguishing between false styles and true styles, styles that conceal and
styles that define." The result is not, as Malkoff suggests, "a poetry of cancellation or absence Of silence," but "a poetry which must make and remake
itself, again and over again, in order, like the perpetual lover, to get the world
right." In a syllogism whose undistributed middle is guaranteed to horrify any
logician, Oberg proposes for Lowell that "to live is to change; to live is
to love; therefore, to love is to change."
The strength of Oberg's book rests not in its definitions or logic so much as
in its descriptive responses to nuance, particularly in the crucial Freudian matters
of "love" and" death." Oberg perceives, for example, that Berryman's Dream
Songs "keep[s] refusing to yield what it is about." The volume leaves an impression that "Berryman is wrjting a love poem which the piling negatives and
hypothetical 'if's' never succeed in overwhelming completely" and where a
II counterwill" insists on "an aclmowledgment of human need for love: warmth,
rest, sustenance, music (' notes'), and light (' sun')." "In his need to love and
be loved," Oberg discovers, "Berryman's Henry must confront the limitations
of himself as a desiring man," so much so that Berryman "significantly" surrounds love" as a word and as a concept, with quotation marks." In contrast,
Creeley's "thinking in words is ... radically dramatic and emotive" and "can
a5sume the proportions of a godlike remaking of a world ... .In ways that refuse
to distinguish between literature and jotting, poetry and prose, lyric and pornogr.aphy," his" intentional strategies" are" to write on behalf of or for love,
to make language come true, and to align language with matters of love and
self." For Plath, there is a comparable "wish and need to clear a space for
love" at the same time her work inclines "to see love as unreal" and fear an
inability "to give and receive." Distortions and displacements of love eventually occur, and Oberg interprets the final poems not as "the mystically calm,
orderly poems which some critics have seen them to be. Instead, they are the
terrible, terrifying creations of a woman who, near the end of a life, still could
not do without love, even if she never learned what to do with it."
The combined arguments of Conarroe and Arpin accept an "opacity" for
"post-modernism" similar to that of Oberg's study, suggesting in- the process
the eventual model of most books dealing with John Berryman's work. Differing
only in what constitutes Berryman's "supreme" achievement, Conarroe and
Arpin view his career as a preface to a major poem. In the case of Conarroe, this
poem is Tbe Dream Songsj in the case of Arpin, Homage to kIistress Bradstreet.
Berryman then "declines" slightly into Love & Fame, Delusions, Etc., and the
posthumously edited Henry's Fate. Both critics presume that autobiographical
poetry should be "ethical" and, although they duly report Berryman's quarrel
with Eliot about "consistent personality II and Berryman's insistence in the
"Scholia" to Love & Fame that "each of the four movements criticizes backward the preceding, 'Until Part 4 wipes out altogether all earlier presentations,"
both seem not to understand the aesdlctic implications of this "choosing for
the momcnt." Berryman is fighting to preserve the "art sense" of the lyric
in the face not only of popular fashion but also of a tradition of ethical
lyricism that begins prior to Boethius and extends through Nietzsche into James

r
186

BOOK REvIEWS

Joyce. Berryman may fail in these final' books to make his "momentary choices"
as attractive as the "momentary choices" that occur in the traditionally "false 11
narrative worlds of H 01llage to Mistress Bradstreet and The Dream Songs, but
morc attention might have been given his effort. In allowing Berryman's Sonnets
to be printed, he had indicated that his concern was "whether wickedness/was
soluble in art," and certainly Audcn's recent successes in this area had indicated
that a poet might transcend the ethical demands of post-modernism. Jarrell's
revic\v of The Shield of Achilies describes a high order of religion and metamorality resulting from a "Conscious and Moral Audeo ...quite consciously and
immorally" letting an "Unconscious Auden" have its play.
Conarroe admits" outright that most of [Berryman's] work of the 1940s (and
late 1930s) appeals to [him] primarily because of its relationship to the later
books." He finds the work in Five Young American Poets (1940) and Poems
(1942) H utterly unexceptional" and inhibited. In The Dispossessed (1948), he
singles out only "Canto Amor" and "Nervous Songs" as "major achievements." He finds the lover of Berryman's Sonnets" still held in check," although
threatening already to burst forth into the "exuberant persona" that will make
The Dre(fm Songs a masterpiece of "private sorrows." H omuge to Mistress Bradstreet continues to l{eep this exuberance in check by allowing the work's energy
and passion to emerge in the persona of Bradstreet, and in the book's longest
and best chapter, he pr.esents Ius argument for the achievements of The Dream
Songs. For Conarroe, "the songs represent, as much as anything else, attempts
[by Berryman] to get his dreams, memories, and fears out in the open as a
means of coming to grips ,vith them, of escaping their tyranny." Conarroe finds
the various poems "for the most part" neither "placed in the order in which
they were composed nor. .. organized around any clearly delimited period of
time." Nonetheless, unlike Pound's Cantos or Williams' Paterson, which" could
have been continued indefinitely," Conarroe detects a "unity" in that "it is
not possible to imagine a reopening of The Dream Songs after number 385,
so absolute is the sense of closure." He argues, in addition, that the Ie archaic
and Latinate constructions.. crumpled syntax, odd diction, idiomatic conversation, and conscious violation of grammatical rules" that comprise Henry's
voice are finally" far better suited to the expression of [Berryman's] fears and
struggles than... the more impersonal, less consistent mode" that dominates the
final volumes.
Arpin is less concerned with the expression of Berryman's individual fears
and struggles than with the allusive nature of the writing, arguing that "Berryman was an enonnously well-read man," who used the knowledge he gained from
reading "both to create a world and to give the effect of a man ransacking our
culture in an attempt to find a way of living in that world." He warns those
who might put much weight on the autobiographical element in Berryman's
work that Berryman's" reading was frequently as important as his experience." In
contrast to Conarroe, Arpin sees Berryman's contribution to Five Young American
Poets as containing" some very fine work." Arpin tends to value more highly,
too, the poems of The Dispossessed. Arpin is best, however, in his tracing of
literary echoes and antecedents in Berryman's Sonnets, Homage to Mistress BradSN'eet, and The Drecrm Songs. Here echoes of Tristan Corbit~re, Sir Philip Sidney,
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Sigmund Freud, Dante, W. B. Yeats, Anne Bradstreet, Stephen Crane, and others
illuminate the "tradition" of poetry which at its WOIst justifies Jarrell's early
complaint that "doing things in a style all its own sometimes seems the primary
object of the poem." Arpin prefers Mistress Bradstreet to The Dream Songs
because it is "more coherent" and "more successful," adding that the latter
sections of Tbe Dream Songs fail to redeem "trival experiences" and the
"unity" of the whole does not prevent "many individual parts ...being juggled
around without seriously affecting the structure." The late poems Arpin sees
attempting" to do with language more than the language will successfully allow."
The failures are not of character or individual talent 50 much as of desperate
experimentation-an exhaustion of individual, purposive linguistic possibility.
JEIlOME MAZZARO

San Diego State Unive7·sity
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